

Intergenerational Value Change and Transitions to Democracy: Toward the Consolidation of a Third Wave Generation?

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The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and their impact in intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker 2004; Schuman 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events that transformed industrialized societies; identifying systematic intergenerational values differences between pre war and post war cohorts (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of those born and raised under the new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar 2010, Tessler 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al. 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people's political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro democratic orientations and the consolidation of a "3W Generation" since post honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro democratic orientations after regime change. To test these claims, I identify period effects from intergenerational effects among the 3W cohort and two elder age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as a control group, and compare the trends among same age groups between younger and established democracies. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 --the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change-- and 2005-2007 --its last wave available. Finally, I test the generation's effects hypothesis with regression analyses.

Intergenerational Value Change and Transitions to Democracy: Toward the Consolidation of a Third Wave Generation?

More than two decades after the Third Wave (3W) of democratization expanded democracy into new countries throughout Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and South Asia, it is still unclear to what extent inter-generational value change has taken place, and how democratic the orientations of the younger generations are in comparison to those of their elders. Has a new political generation, the “Third Wave Generation” emerged across new democracies? I believe this is crucial component in understanding the survival and consolidation of democracy.

The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and their impact in intergenerational value differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim 1952; Jennings and Stoker, 2004; Schuman 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life; such as the Big Wars, the Cold War and the Vietnam War. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events that transformed industrialized societies during the pre war and post war period; identifying systematic intergenerational values differences between pre war and post war cohorts (Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1997). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behavior of those born and raised under new democratic regimes has been mostly ignored. Among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar (2010); Tessler (2004), and Niemi, E. Catterberg et al. (1996).

Generational replacement presupposes *the formative years hypothesis*, a period of openness during which political orientations are formed (Schuman 2011). It assumes the presence of life cycle effects as people ages in the formation and dynamics of political attitudes and behavior, and identifies attitudinal fluctuation (or instability) mostly during late adolescence and early adulthood. After being formed, they tend to persist across people’s lives (Jennings 2004). Crucial to the formative years hypothesis is what Mannheim (1928) more than half a century ago refers to as the *stratification of experience*. Although older and younger cohorts may experience the same new event, they do so differently because first experiences are not the same as those superimposed upon other early impressions. A fundamental implication is that “adult socio-political dispositions are strongly rooted in pre-adult experiences “ (Inglehart 1997, p41).

The formative years hypothesis is a crucial pillar, in turn, to understand the making process of generational memory, and identifying its potential impact on future attitudes and actions. A *generation* is formed when unique events affect people of the same birth cohort at an early stage, shaping them in distinctive ways. As Schuman (2011), puts it, “Belonging to a generation endows each of us with a place in the historical process, and this, in turn, limits us to a particular range of experiences, thoughts and actions” (p3).

What factors do mainly shape pre adult political experiences? *Parental transmission* has been traditionally considered the most influential variable in people’s early political socialization. Since the *American Voter* (1960), parent’s values and predispositions has been shown to critically impacted political identification. However, most recently new studies indicate that, although influential, it is not necessarily the prevailing factor in the development of critical socio-political orientations. Jennings conducted panel data research that arrives at different conclusions, depending on which specific political orientation is analyzed. Regarding party identification, vote choice, and interest in politics, Jennings et al (2009) argue that “parents can have an enormous degree of influence on the political learning that takes place in pre-adulthood “ (p795). Yet, in relation to social trust and civil engagement, Jennings and Stoker (2004) conclude that their impact is much lower than traditionally expected. “Parents do appear to play a role in shaping the extent to which their children enter adulthood with trusting or distrusting dispositions, and in the extent to which they get involved in voluntary associations, both in high school and subsequently. Still, the magnitude of these family linkages are modest at best” (pp355-356).

As mentioned above, robust studies show both in the American and comparative literature that *historic or period effects* during late adolescence and early adulthood could greatly matter in the formation of people’s most rooted beliefs. Important political events define what is salient and significant for young people as they first face the larger political world. Such events, however, are usually less important for adults, who tend to assimilate new experiences into an attitudinal framework that is already well developed, and who lived their formative years under different historical circumstances. This socialization process produces distinct cohorts or political generations who respond attitudinally and behaviorally in a similar fashion to new political events. In other words, when a new political generation does emerge, *shared attitudes* should be identifiable among the age cohort who experienced the same events during their formative years .

The American literature identifies three main political generations during the XX century (Jennings and Stoker 2004). The pre war generation spent at least part of their pre adult years

during the Depression and nearly three fifths of the males served in WWII; during adulthood, it experienced the post war boom and the beginning of the cold war as adults. It is usually characterized as the “civic generation” because its strong civic commitment. The post war generation, or “baby boomers”, spent their early years during the domestic tranquility and prosperity of the 50s. But critical events such as Civil Rights Movement, Vietnam War and Watergate shaped their pre adult period, becoming the “protest generation”. Finally, for Americans coming of age in the 1980s and 1990s, unlike the previous generations, “history possesses little by way of defining historical moments” that could, in turn, define a specific political identity. In turn, the comparative literature shows a post-materialist shift between pre and post war cohorts in established democracies (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). High levels of prosperity and existential security during people’s formative years were conducive to the emergence of pro-democratic values that characterize the post war cohorts even more than their elders. Rising levels of economic and physical security led to increasingly higher levels of tolerance, trust, and mass participation among younger generations.

But research on democratization has given little attention to the effects of early socialization on the possible emergence of a “Third Wave Generation”. Is the youngest generation in younger democracies growing with distinct orientations from their elders, and from similar age groups in established regimes? Are these orientations supportive toward democracy? Previous research shows mixed trends.

On the one hand, research on the trajectories of political orientations in new democracies over time after regime change uncovers a worrisome trend that calls into question both the impact of the 3W political socialization on people’s democratic orientations and the emergence of new generations. On average, political participation and trust in new democracies *declined* in the years following regime change, while tolerance toward elite corruption and detachment with the law increased (Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Catterberg & Zuasnabar 2010; Uslaner 2004).

There are elements peculiar to the dynamics of democratic transitions that usually stimulate people’s expectations about the effectiveness of new administrations, ultimately leading to skepticism. During the 3W, the original belief among the publics --often reinforced by elite discourse-- that democracy not only provides civil liberties but also improves economic well-being was a crucial factor in motivating these high expectations. If the economy subsequently performed poorly, disillusionment with democracy was likely. Moreover, the experience of living under an authoritarian regime engendered unrealistic expectations about democracy and

democratic politics. An increasing discrepancy between expectations and reality led to democratic disillusionment, especially where the new regimes seemed incompetent. In the aftermath of the transition, a “post-honeymoon effect” took place in most 3W democracies, as the immediate need for participation receded, the euphoria of democratization wore off, and political trust eroded -- particularly in cases where democratization brought severe disillusionment (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002).

Moreover, authors such as Niemi et al. (1995) and E. Catterberg (1991) argued more than two decades ago that, in contrast to the “natural socialization hypothesis” usually assumed in established democracies, inter-generational transmission of democratic values in 3W nations is uncertain: “In newer democracies, automatic transmission of democratic values from one generation to the next cannot be taken for granted ...Older generations are themselves untutored about democratic processes, and they may fail to embrace democratic values or waiver in their own commitment to them” (Niemi et al., p. 465). In the Southern Cone of Latin America, an absence of democratic values among the adult population was identified since the early stages of democratization. As E. Catterberg noted, on the basis of surveys conducted during the military regime and after the transition to constitutional government, “during the first five years of the constitutional government [responses on] many libertarian dimensions moved backward” (107-108). Not surprisingly, the emergence of a political generation is an infrequent phenomenon. In addition, for some transformative events, the main distinction might be between those who were deeply affected at any point in the life course and those born in subsequent years who had no direct experience at all (Schuman 2011). As Tessler (2004) concludes, “political generations are relatively rare” (p188).

On the other hand, some factors suggest that people may have adopted more democratic orientations, at least in some dimensions, and especially among younger age groups. The 3W of democratization, contrary to many political events that are not highly salient, or even if they are salient, erode rapidly, transformed dramatically people every day’s lives. And although these transformations did not follow a relatively linear and stable process, they tended to have a lasting impact in the economic and political organizations of most societies. Despite differences across countries, an almost universal fact about the 3W is that brought more openness in formal and informal institutional settings, more freedom of expression and association and more exposure to independent media (see, for instance, Freedom House civil liberties and political rights indices). As Huntington pointed out in a 1997 article, “A quarter-century ago, authoritarian governments

--communist politburos, military juntas, or personal dictatorships-- were the rule. Today, hundreds of millions of people who previously suffered under tyrants live in freedom” (p3).

In this context, I argue that the 3W was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro democratic orientations and the consolidation of a “Third Wave Generation” since opposite effects influenced their trajectories after regime change. On the one hand, socialization processes during transitions to democracy are expected to encourage the development of more democratic and pluralist political attitudes and behaviors, especially among those born and raised under the new institutional settings. On the other, post honeymoon effects are expected to constrain this development by increasing political disillusionment and dissatisfaction. In addition, weak intergenerational transmission of democratic values and the likely impact of direct experience with the dramatic political transformations across different age groups might have also restrained the development of generational replacement. Therefore, I expect to find some key pro democratic orientations to deepen as the result of social interaction under the new openness and freedom, while others to weaken as the result of increasing disillusionment toward the new regimes and fragile parental diffusion. In particular, I focus in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. Finally, I expect that same age groups in established democracies --where the critical distinction among political generations is between pre war and post war cohorts-- experienced more stability (or lower attitudinal change rates) during the 3W years.

To analyze these expectations, I study the trajectories of political trust, political participation and tolerance toward diversity in 3W democracies as well as established democracies after regime change, and test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data to explore these questions from 1990 --the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change-- and 2005-2007 --its last wave available.¹ More than 25

¹ The WVS has been conducted in about 80 societies in different waves of interviews between 1981 and 2005, including new and established democracies, as well as non-democratic countries. The first wave took place in 1981-83, followed by a second one in 1990, a third one in 1995-96, and a fourth one in 2000-01 and then a fifth wave was conducted in 2005-07. The next wave will be completed by the end of 2012. In 1990, the WVS critically expanded from 21 to 45 nations, incorporating almost 20 countries under transitional processes.

years after Raúl Alfonsín took office in Argentina, the temporal simultaneity between 3W democratization and the implementation of the WVS project allow us to study the impact of political socialization in recently democratized contexts over time. This simultaneity was not pure coincidence; rather, it evidenced at the time the new openness experienced by more than 30 nations across the globe.

Trust, tolerance, participation and democracy

Political trust, political tolerance and political participation are intrinsically linked to democracy. *Political trust* refers to citizens' confidence in political institutions. Trust is especially important for democratic governments since they cannot rely on coercion to the same extent as other regimes. During periods of economic turmoil, for instance, democratic stability requires citizens to have sufficient trust in economic and political institutions to accept temporary economic pain in return for the promise of better economic conditions at some uncertain future.

Successful democracies are driven by high levels of both trust in other people and in government. In a well-ordered society "everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and the basic social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy these principles" (Rawls 1971: 454, in Uslaner 2004, p2).

Tolerance is a critical value to socialize and internalize for democratic functioning and survival. As Sartori argues (2001), pluralism, the "genetic code of an open society," presupposes and requires high doses of tolerance. While pluralism asserts that diversity and dissent are values that enhance the individual and also his political city, those who tolerate concede that others have the right to think in "wrong beliefs". In new democracies, an underlying culture of tolerance is crucial to develop the legitimacy that enables political institutions to weather difficult times (Inglehart 2003). In particular, "tolerance or intolerance of homosexuals, although it does not overtly refer to support for democracy, provides a substantially stronger predictor of the degree to which democratic institutions exist, than does any question that explicitly asks how one feels about democracy" (p54).

Finally, *political participation* points out to activity that has the intent of affecting or influencing government action. Political participation impacts governmental decisions directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of

people how make those policies (Verba et al. 1995). In a democracy, citizens canalize their demands and expectations through political participation. Very low political participation due to disillusionment and discontent (rather than exceptionally widespread political satisfaction) weakens critical pillars of communication between the citizenry and the political elite. In particular, when a feeling of hopelessness with respect to the political system dominates, inactivity is more likely to take place rather than action. On the other hand, if an implicit trust in democratic mechanisms to channel people's demands prevails, the likelihood of participation increases substantially (Catterberg 2003).

Methodological considerations

I define the 3W cohort (C3) as those respondents born after 1965 in the WVS data set. This means that in 1990, the year of regime change, they were 25 years old or younger. For analytical purposes, I distinguish those born between 1965 and 1974 from those born between 1975 and 1990, and focus the analysis on the former. Since the latter was too young to be included in the 1990 surveys, this distinction prevents us from comparing non-equivalent populations over time.

In addition to the 3W cohort, and to effectively identify intergenerational value change from overall attitudinal shifts, I also include two older cohorts in this study: those respondents born between 1945-1964 (who were 26 to 45 years old in 1990, C2), and those between 1925-1944 (who were between 46 and 65 years old in 1990, C1). The 1901-1924 cohort is not included because its results, given the small number of cases, are not statistically significant.

Although the entire WVS dataset is much broader than what I use in this paper, the availability of data and questions for the same countries in 1990 and 2005 reduced the number of countries for our analysis to twenty four, thirteen young democracies and eleven established democracies. The younger democracies are: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, East Germany, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Slovenia and Turkey. The older ones are: Britain, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, and West Germany. Each national representative sample includes about 1,200 face to face interviews,

though sample sizes vary from country to country. Most surveys are conducted among populations over eighteen, although in some surveys the age range starts at fifteen.²

To estimate political trust, I use a measure of “confidence in parliament”. Other political institutions asked in the same battery were not available for all countries in the two waves included in this study. To measure political participation, I constructed an index that indicates the percentage of the public saying that they have actually engaged in at least one of the following three forms of elite challenging activities: signing a petition, attending a lawful demonstration, or joining a boycott. The participation index is a dichotomy variable; 1 indicates that the respondent participated in at least one of these three political activities, while 0 indicates that the respondent did not participate in any of these actions. To estimate tolerance toward diversity, I use a battery of questions about predispositions toward different minorities (“On this list are various groups of people, could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?”). Based on these questions, I constructed a tolerance index that is the sum of opinions toward five groups generally stigmatized: people of a different race, immigrants or foreign workers, homosexuals, drug addicts and people with AIDS. Finally, the tolerance index is an ordinal additive measure that goes from 0 to 5, where 0 indicates high intolerance toward diversity, while 5 indicates high tolerance toward diversity. In other words, the lower limit of the index refers to those respondents *explicitly* mentioning that “they would not like to have as neighbors” anyone belonging to any of the five minorities, while the upper limit refers to those respondents that do not sort out any group as potential neighbors. Intermediate values show ambivalent orientations toward the acceptance of minorities as likely residents of their communities.

Age Group Changes over Time in Trust, Participation and Tolerance

By identifying critical variations between the year of regime change (1990) and the latest WVS wave available (2005-2007) in both younger and established democracies, this section analyzes the extent to which generational change took place among younger and older age groups in their orientations toward trust, tolerance and participation during the 3W of democratization. I focus

² The year of regime change corresponds to the year of fieldwork in young democracies, with the exception of Argentina, where regime change took place before most 3W democracies, in December 1983. In the case of Peru, the 1990 data is not available, and in the cases of Brazil, Poland and Sweden the 1990 data sets have limited variables. In these countries, I use 1995 data.

on the rate of change of each variable by each cohort between 1990 and 2005-2007 to identify systematic age group differences over time. *Overall, variations in trust, participation and tolerance adopted very distinct trajectories in 3W democracies, when compared with established ones.*

Trust in parliament experienced a decrease in 3W countries, affecting all three age groups: among the younger cohorts (those born between 1945-1964 and 1965-1974) it was almost 40%, among the eldest it was even higher, 45%. In twelve countries, and across all age groups, there was a decrease in the percentage who expressed confidence in parliament. Political trust is intrinsically unstable because is highly sensitive to governmental performance and was especially affected by post honeymoon effects during democratization (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006). As the next section suggests, this higher sensitivity to short term factors, such as poor economic delivery, constrained the generation of higher amounts of political trust despite the dramatic political transformations of the 3W. More than a decade later, a large and persistent decline took place. In established democracies a decrease also occurred, but it was significantly smaller (11%) and mostly among the eldest cohort. The 1945-1964 cohort remained constant, while the variation in the youngest cohort was almost marginal.

(Table 1 about here)

The Political Participation Index shows the overall pattern of change in participation from 1990 to 2005. Following the same trend than political trust, in most new democracies there was a contraction of political action during the years after regime change. The percentage of respondents saying they signed a petition, joined a boycott or attended a manifestation displayed a similar reduction in all age groups (on average, 11%). Despite this overall decline, there were contrasting trends at the country level. Three South American countries (Argentina, Brazil and Peru) experienced important upward shifts, yet they were offset by bigger negative variations in the other 3W nations.

As in political trust, the decrease in political participation is associated with a post honeymoon decline. The struggle for democracy motivated the organization of ordinary men and women into a variety of groups, which collectively had the effect of “aiding the assaults on the seats of power”. Post-transitional problems --especially the combination of rising aspirations of economic well-being and persisting inequality-- led to declining participation rates in most 3W

countries, especially in the years immediately after regime change (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). In established democracies, on the other hand, an increase took place; especially among the youngest cohort, who experienced a 20% variation. Despite a growing body of literature concerning a decline in political activism in post-industrial societies, the findings indicate that the upward tendency of protest politics predicted by the post material shift hypothesis produced a sustained and systematic increase in elite-challenging activities during the 1990-2005 period.

Involvement in political participation in younger democracies, which was higher among C2 and C3, experienced practically a similar negative shift across age groups. Therefore, life cycle effects were probably not a critical factor in this decline. In established democracies, visible increases affected both the eldest and especially the youngest cohorts. In particular, (C3-C2) reached the highest inter-age group variation of all three variables. Therefore, formative years effects are identified since respondents that were in their late adolescence and early adulthood underwent the most significant changes between 1990 and 2005.

(Table 2 about here)

In sharp contrast with trust in parliament and political participation, tolerance of diversity significantly increased in younger democracies across all age groups. As the Tolerance Index shows, this positive shift in respondents expressing more acceptance toward people of different race, homosexuals, foreign workers, drug addicts or people with aids was similar among the three cohorts; on average 24%. All countries experienced increases within the eldest cohorts, and within C1 and C2 all except Slovenia and Turkey. Again, in two Southern Cone countries, Argentina and Brazil, the acceptance levels are similar, and in many cases even higher, to those experienced in most established democracies.

This is a significant change, not only because it affected all countries and age groups but also because the usually stable constitution that characterizes attitudes toward tolerance. On the other hand, in established democracies, there was little overall change. The Tolerance Index remained practically constant in most nations and across age groups, largely because rising tolerance of homosexuality was offset by rising rejection of foreign workers.

Changes in tolerance toward diversity were almost marginal both in younger and established democracies. Therefore, no life cycle effects appeared to be involved in these variations either. Yet, in both groups of nations, the younger generations expressed more

tolerance toward others than the older ones, reaching a 14 points difference with the eldest cohort. This shift suggests that process of intergenerational change could tend to bring rising tolerance in the long run.

(Table 3 about here)

Finally, did 3W and established democracies converge during 1990 and 2005? Or, on the contrary, differences were accentuated? As previously mentioned, distinct trajectories characterized both groups in most variables. Put differently, the findings identify fifteen years after regime change a clear tendency toward divergence, increasing the “trust” and “participation” gaps between the two groups of countries. Established democracies more than doubled the levels of political trust and political participation of 3W democracies across all age groups, while tolerance’s discrepancies were still significant but smaller. The differences between the youngest cohorts in 2005 show the magnitude of the divergence: trust in parliament was 37% versus 20% and political participation 61% versus 33%. Tolerance of diversity, despite its reduction, showed a 20 points difference, 76% versus 56%.

Trust in parliament, although fell in both established and younger democracies, displayed significantly different shifts; increasing the distance between 12 to 14 points across age cohorts. Political participation followed a similar pattern than trust in parliament, reaching a 28 points difference. Yet, since there were strong variations among 3W nations in their levels of participation, these differences were visibly lower in South American countries. On the other hand, differences in tolerance decreased in all age groups between 8 and 10 points. But in some new democracies the younger generations still show very low levels of tolerance; especially in Turkey, were less than 5% expressed high levels of tolerance.

A “Generation Effects” Model

To test for generation effects, I estimate multivariate regressions of political trust, political participation and tolerance toward diversity in the thirteen 3W democracies included in this study. More specifically, the regressions allow to identify if there were distinguishable and durable age groups’ effects on these political attitudes fifteen years after democratization took place. I use the 1990-1991 and 2005-2007 waves of the World Values Surveys. As mentioned above, the former

coincides with the year of regime change in most countries, while the latter is the most recent WVS data available. As I claim in the introduction, increasing disillusionment with poor economic performance and weak generational replacement are expected to erode political trust and political participation. On the other hand, intergenerational value change is expected to be associated with higher levels of tolerance.

To measure the dependant variables, I use the same indicators analyzed in the previous section: confidence in parliament, the political participation index and the tolerance index. To measure generational effects, I use the same age cohort variable, which distinguishes those born between 1965 and 1974 (the 3W cohort, C3), from those born between 1945 and 1965 (C2) and between 1925 and 1944 (C1). To capture the full effect of age cohort, I introduce an interaction variable (“cohort*year”) that measures changes on the impact of “cohort” over time. In other words, this interaction tells us if belonging to a specific age group produces differentiated effects on trust, participation or tolerance in 1990 and 2005. To estimate economic performance, since no direct question is asked in the World Values Survey, I use one’s satisfaction with his or her economic well being (“How satisfy are you with the financial situation of your household?”). As socio-demographics variables, I only include gender, because education was not asked in many countries in the 1990 wave and income correlates with self income report. I also include a variable that identifies the different countries and a dummy for time to control for autocorrelation among a nation’s different surveys.

Since the dependent variables are dummy and ordinal indices, I use probit (for participation) and ordered probit estimations (for trust and tolerance). To control for fluctuations on the variance across samples, I incorporate robust standard errors. I also weight the estimations by population size for pooled analyses. An overview of the results of the multivariate analyses is shown in Table 4.

(Table 4 about here)

“Trust in parliament” is negatively impacted by “cohort”: the younger the age group, the smaller the propensity to trust. The interaction variable also affects “trust”, this means that the effect of cohort on confidence in parliament changed between 1990 and 2005. Yet, its negative coefficient implies a significant reduction on the full impact of cohort. When the two coefficients are added, its effect is almost marginal (-0.03). In terms of probabilities, the propensity to trust

among those respondents who said they trust parliament “quite a lot” decreases from 27% in C1 to 22% in C3. When the full effect is considered, these probabilities are lower than 10% in both age groups. The 1965-1974 cohort in the year of regime change expressed a smaller propensity to trust than their elders, yet in 2005 the impact of being raised during democratization was visibly weakened. As described in the previous section, respondents between 46 and 65 in the year of regime change experienced even a stronger decline than younger cohorts in their level of confidence, showing the three age groups remarkably low levels of trust in 2005. In contrast, “financial satisfaction” raises the propensity to trust. Respondents who are more satisfied with their household income tend to trust more in parliament; the probability of trusting quite a lot among unsatisfied respondents is 22%, this figure raises to 31% among those satisfied.

“Political participation”, unlike trust in parliament, is positively impacted by “cohort”: the younger age groups tend to participate more than the older ones. The interaction term is also significant and presents an opposite effect. Consequently, as in the case of trust, it visibly reduces the full impact of cohort (0.045) on the propensity to be involved in at least one political activity. The probabilities of C1 and C3, among those who participated, increased from 20 to 25%. The total effect is also lower than 10% for both age groups. Put differently, in the year of regime change, the propensity to participate of C3 was greater than that of the older cohort, but this difference was weakened 15 years later. As shown above, all cohorts decreased their level of participation, although to a lesser degree than “trust”. As expected, financially satisfied respondents tend to participate more. The associated probabilities among those who participate are practically the same than its effect on trust, 20% and 32% among unsatisfied and satisfied respondents respectively.

Unlike “trust” and “participation”, “tolerance” is positively impacted both by “cohort” and the interaction term. This implies, first, that the younger the age group, the more likely that he or she expresses high tolerance toward diversity. Second, it means that the full effect of cohort (0,128) was not diminished over time, on the contrary, it was reinforced fifteen years after regime change. The propensity to participate among tolerants increases from 36 to 44% when cohort changes from C1 to C3. These probabilities tell us that age cohort matters on respondent’s propensity to trust. As previously mentioned, all cohorts experienced a positive shift in their level of tolerance, although the difference between age groups increased in 2005, reaching a difference of almost 15 points between the younger and older cohorts. Financial satisfaction also increases tolerance, and shows probabilities very similar to the “cohort’s” probabilities (38% and 46%).

Discussion

This paper raises two central questions: if a new political generation, a “Third Wave Generation”, emerged across young democracies, and if those born and raised after regime change are more democratic than their elders. I focused in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture -- trust, tolerance and participation.

I looked to age group changes over time in these dimensions, operationalized by trust in parliament, a political participation index and a tolerance toward diversity index, in new and established democracies. “3W effects” were expected if variations were clearly stronger in countries that underwent democratization; while a more stable path was expected in those countries with decades of continuous years of democracy in 1990. The data supports these expectations. The publics of younger democracies experienced significant variations between regime change and 2005-2007 in their dispositions toward the three dimensions, especially in people’s levels of political participation and tolerance. On the contrary, the publics of established democracies remained relatively stable, except in their involvement in political activities, which experienced a visible shift.

The direction of change also underwent different trends between and within the two groups of countries. In younger democracies, trust in parliament and participation experienced important declines; trust in others also decrease, but undertook a smaller variation. Yet, tolerance experienced a significant positive shift. In contrast, in established democracies, trust in other and tolerance remained practically constant, political trust showed a slight decrease and participation increased substantially, especially among the youngest. This increase in political involvement supports Inglehart and Catterberg’s (2002) conclusion more than a decade ago: “Simply put, the claims that the publics of established democracies are becoming disengaged from civic life and apathetic are mistaken”.

The variations experienced by younger regimes suggest that 3W effects did influence the development of political attitudes during democratic transitions. However, socialization under the new democratic settings did not produce on average higher levels of political trust and political participation; showing worryingly low levels fifteen years after regime change. Political erosion increased as posthoneymoon effects linked to increasing disillusionment with economic performance took place across most newly democratized countries in Latin America, and Eastern and Central Europe. Weak intergenerational transmission of democratic values and the impact of

direct experience with the striking transformations of regime change across all age groups might have constrained the surge of a new generation of democrats.

However, the significant increase in tolerance does bring some optimistic signs for democratic consolidation. During the years since 1990, tolerance rose substantially in new democracies but only very slightly in established democracies. This finding suggests that democratization did bring to certain extent a more open society, conducive to rising tolerance of diversity. As the generation effect models show, trust in parliament and political participation are explained by one's financial satisfaction, as proxy to economic performance, while cohort effects significantly diminished over time. On the other hand, tolerance is clearly affected by both economic satisfaction as well as generational effects. The obtained probabilities tell us that, fifteen years after regime change, age cohort matters on people's propensity to tolerate. In other words, inter-generational value change did take place in this dimension. Recent studies indicate that this upward shift in tolerance after regime change may be part of a broader trend of support for self-expression values and individual freedom, especially among younger generations, in newer regimes (Siemienska, Basañez and Moreno 2010).

Overall, the findings show that the 3W of democratization was a transformative event that had a lasting impact on people's political attitudes and actions, although not necessarily in a pro-democratic direction; increasing the divergence between older and younger regimes in critical dimensions of their political culture. Moreover, there is not enough evidence, despite some age differences did take place, that indicates the consolidation of a 3W Generation. Yet, it is clear that the publics of the new democracies have been becoming more tolerant, especially among younger cohorts, converging with the publics of established democracies in this respect. After all, this is good news for 3W democracies.

Table 1**Political Trust over Time**

Trust in Parliament by Age Cohort in 1990 and 2005

% saying they trust "quite a lot" and "a great deal"

	1925-1944 (C1)		1945-1964 (C2)		1965-1974 (C3)	
	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007
<i>Established Democracies</i>						
Britain	47	34	41	31	34	36
Finland	41	52	29	57	30	54
France	43	30	44	25	46	33
Italy	32	32	28	31	32	35
Japan	36	31	24	21	19	11
Netherlands	50	58	52	53	57	50
Spain	40	55	37	52	30	48
Sweden	47	51	41	57	44	49
Switzerland	na	na	na	na	na	na
US	49	19	34	18	45	21
W.Germany	54	29	44	24	42	32
mean	44	39	37	37	38	37
<i>3W Democracies</i>						
Argentina	19	15	14	12	15	11
Brazil	40	22	34	25	29	27
Bulgaria	50	21	44	24	49	13
Chile	62	29	67	25	58	26
E.Germany	46	15	37	15	32	17
Mexico	37	21	32	28	36	27
Peru	15	5	14	9	14	6
Poland	33	13	30	11	27	11
Romania	25	18	18	17	17	17
Russia	50	20	37	18	34	22
S.Korea	44	35	32	27	25	19
Slovenia	36	18	37	18	26	13
Turkey	65	68	53	59	51	56
mean	42	23	36	22	33	20

1995 wave used for Sweden, Brazil, Peru, and Poland

Source: World Values Surveys

Table 2**Participation over Time**

Participation Index by Age Cohort in 1990 and 2005

% saying they participated in at least one elite-challenging activity

	1925-1944 (C1)		1945-1964 (C2)		1965-1974 (C3)	
	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007
<i>Established Democracies</i>						
Britain	67	72	75	71	75	68
Finland	15	38	28	54	23	65
France	53	68	60	71	46	72
Italy	41	48	54	57	52	64
Japan	53	46	54	49	29	35
Netherlands	44	37	62	49	45	52
Spain	21	27	39	39	41	44
Sweden	64	67	82	81	78	80
Switzerland	na	na	na	na	na	na
US	69	84	71	77	51	71
W.Germany	53	39	68	55	69	60
mean	48	53	59	60	51	61
<i>3W Democracies</i>						
Argentina	19	22	20	35	18	38
Brazil	44	47	52	57	52	65
Bulgaria	16	10	30	19	34	16
Chile	28	23	33	23	34	23
E.Germany	70	41	83	55	82	59
Mexico	40	29	41	34	38	23
Peru	28	33	21	42	26	37
Poland	19	17	25	27	27	29
Romania						
Russia	33	26	46	19	41	16
S.Korea	30	31	35	37	49	45
Slovenia	20	23	32	34	33	34
Turkey	11	10	16	13	14	15
mean	30	26	36	33	37	33

1995 wave used for Sweden, Brazil, Peru and Poland

Source: World Values Surveys

Table 3**Tolerance of Diversity over Time**

Tolerance Index by Age Cohort in 1990 and 2005

% "tolerants"

	1925-1944 (C1)		1945-1964 (C2)		1965-1974 (C3)	
	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007
<i>Established Democracies</i>						
Britain	57	58	68	76	79	73
Finland	55	54	63	68	49	73
France	65	32	75	51	82	59
Italy	43	47	58	61	61	69
Japan	na	na	na	na	na	na
Netherlands	71	73	87	80	84	84
Spain	49	75	67	80	70	79
Sweden	82	84	88	96	94	93
Switzerland	97	78	98	84	98	89
US	55	51	60	68	53	69
W.Germany	53	64	67	78	74	73
mean	63	62	73	74	75	76
<i>3W Democracies</i>						
Argentina	52	71	64	89	74	88
Brazil	69	66	71	74	77	79
Bulgaria	24	32	22	37	25	38
Chile	42	50	45	59	45	62
E.Germany	56	68	68	79	65	74
Mexico	21	55	34	57	31	67
Peru	38	44	38	47	42	53
Poland	22	26	32	41	43	46
Romania	17	32	23	34	33	42
Russia	14	19	18	22	21	23
S.Korea	na	na	na	na	na	na
Slovenia	41	35	38	56	35	71
Turkey	5	5	5	4	9	5
mean	33	42	38	50	42	54

1995 wave used for Sweden, Brazil, Peru, and Poland

Source: World Values Surveys

Table 4**Generation Effects Model in Thirteen 3W Democracies**

Cohort Influence on Trust, Participation and Tolerance

	Trust in Parliament	Political Participation Index	Tolerance of Diversity Index
cohort	-.0975 *	0.0723 *	0.0929 *
	(.0132)	(.0137)	(.01034)
cohort*year	.0684 *	-0.0269 *	0.0354 *
	(.0194)	(.0061)	(.0047)
financial satisfaction	0.0467 *	0.0476 *	0.0245 *
	(.0029)	(.0038)	(.0029)
gender			0.0569 *
			(.0145)
year	-.5570 *		
	(.0600)		
country	.0210 *	-0.0332 *	.0576 *
	(.0018)		(.0019)
X2	977.26 *	433.2	1264.92 *
N	25,157	22,073	26,044

*p<.001

Note : Regressions produced probit and ordinal probit estimations, with robust standard errors. Estimations were weighted in order to produce a N of 1,200 for each survey.

Nations included: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, East Germany, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Turkey
Romania, Russia, South Korea, Slovenia and Turkey.

Source: 1990 and 2005 World Values Survey.

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